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E XECUTIVE S UMMARY
he future of Europe Convention is now three months into its task of finding answers to
the challenges and questions of the Laeken declaration.  The central issue for the
Convention is whether it can find a route through the multitude of questions and create
a strong consensus on substantive answers to the three big challenges of democratising the
EU, organizing the politics and policies of the enlarged EU, and developing the EU's voice in
the world.
The enlarged EU of 25 or more members has to be able to cope in both democratic and
efficiency terms with the increased numbers of member states, and increased diversity in
economic and political interests and circumstances.  The status quo is not an option or the
enlarged EU will rapidly find its decision-making and operational mechanisms seizing up - it
will be a stalled and inefficient EU.
The politics of the Convention are unfolding slowly and a myriad of political alignments are
emerging.  But some key differences are showing already - particularly the traditional battle
between  intergovernmentalists and integrationists.  The relative role and powers of the
Council and Commission will be central in determining the nature of the future EU.
Fundamental reform of both institutions is vital in both efficiency and democratic terms.  One
of the big risks is that energy is concentrated on the relative power of the two institutions and
not on their effective reform.  Proposals for a new, five-year, appointed President of the
European Council go in this direction - they will not improve legitimacy and precisely
duplicate the characteristics of the current Commission President.
The paper identifies five scenarios for the future EU to summarise the potential outcomes of
different sets of decisions by the Convention and the IGC:
•  Emergent global political power;
•  Struggling global power;
•  Efficient but weak EU;
•  Efficient but unstable EU;
•  Technocratic, stalled and inefficient EU.
Politics of the Convention
The political dynamics of the Convention are highly complex with a range of developing
political alignments and groupings - governments’ representatives, national MPs,  MEPs,
political parties, national groups, candidate countries etc.  The relative positions, power and
roles of the chair (Giscard), secretariat, presidium, and Convention members will be an
ongoing development, with the outcome of the internal politics impacting strongly on the
nature of the final output.  Key issues include:
•  Nature of the final document – constitutional treaty or political text. Consensus or division
– and extent of options presented (member states prefer options);
•  Presidium not yet developing identity as a political team; top-down or bottom up approach
– wider Convention has many suspicions of presidium and chair, some tensions evident;
•  New political dynamics of the enlarged EU emerging – candidate countries push
successfully for representative on presidium and for use of own languages;
•  General support for strengthening common foreign and security policy and justice and
home affairs, for enhancing economic policy  coordination, and for strengthening
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democratic legitimacy – more differences on social Europe; little support for repatriation
of competences or for lists of competences;
•  Civil society relations – importance of wide-ranging debate around the Convention, with
genuine access and input into the Convention – some criticisms and doubts from NGOs.
Policy and Politics in the Enlarged EU
The enlarged EU has to manage the fundamental problem of increased numbers and diversity
– which pose both democratic and efficiency challenges. The political and economic
geography of the enlarged EU will be substantially different, with differing geopolitical views
and strong pressures to be an effective regional power. Key issues include:
•  Enlarged EU is a small country EU (19 smalls to six bigs at 25) but risks being run as a
big country EU;
•  Greater range and variety of potential alliances and coalitions will increase uncertainty -
revisit Nice voting weights: double-majority voting as the solution; extend QMV and co-
decision;
•  Clarify allocation of competences and application of  subsidiarity – new processes not
lists;
•  Candidates have some common interests in the Convention – including support for a
politically strong EU, EU as a regional power, opposition to a directoire approach and to a
two-speed EU.  New approach to solidarity and cohesion.
The Democratic Problem
There are democratic legitimacy problems of all three main EU institutions.  The relative
powers and reforms of the Council and  the Commission will be fundamental to the nature of
the new EU – radical reforms of both are needed; greater  intergovernmentalism risks
weakening the EU. Other key issues include:
•  Proposals for new European Council President will lead to confusion – with EU having 2
Presidents (Council and Commission) appointed in the same manner, for same time
period. Both Presidents will lack democratic legitimacy.  Council-Commission
coordination may also suffer with increased conflicts, resulting in weak European Council
President and weak Commission;
•  Reform of General Affairs Council – split into two formations, foreign affairs and general
affairs;
•  Commission reform – need for a small Commission, with structures significantly
refocused on the pan-European policy dimension, for effective strategic policy leadership,
and to avoid national influences; greater accountability of Commission and bureaucracy to
EP – election of President by EP, and of Commissioners, or at least individual right of
veto;
•  Step change in communication and participative democracy; new genuine communication
strategies; innovations such as weekly on-line question time, involvement of national MPs
in EP questioning of Commission president and EU presidency; more coherent and
reliable civil dialogue.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Can the EU Have a Strong Voice in the World?
Enlargement underlines the EU’s position in the world as an economic giant and political
dwarf. Global instability and uncertainty, and deteriorating EU-US relationship, add to
pressure for urgent step change in EU’s international role – but the political will of member
states is still the key hurdle. Other key issues include:
•  Diverse legal bases of different international policies problematic: need for a common
framework for trade, aid and development, environment, justice and security, human
rights and foreign policy; merge 3 pillars;
•  Major increase in  coordination of member states’ foreign policies within common
framework needed;
•  Institutional changes include establishment of a separate Foreign Affairs Council; move
towards greater QMV in foreign policy (not security and defence); greater synergy, and in
the medium run merger, of the High Representative and Commissioner for External
Relations posts, with joint position in both institutions.1
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1.  Introduction
After the ambitious language of the Laeken Declaration, the hard work - and the political
manoeuvring - of the future of Europe Convention has begun.  Laeken set three big challenges
for the Convention - on the politics of the enlarged EU, on overcoming the democratic deficit,
and on developing the EU's role in the world so that it could become both a stabilizing power
and a model to others.  But it followed up these strategic challenges, which are indeed vital
questions for the contemporary Union, with a set of over 50 more detailed questions, many of
them highly institutional and technical.
One of the central issues for the Convention is whether it can find a route through this
multitude of questions to forge a strong consensus on substantive and effective answers to
these three big challenges.  The politics of the Convention as it develops are being closely
watched to see whether it can reach a strong consensus without which governments will once
again have a free hand in the subsequent intergovernmental conference (IGC), and to see the
nature of the policy and institutional solutions proposed, in particular, whether they will
produce a constitution for the EU.   But the process of the Convention itself, and not only its
output, is of considerable importance: will its work and its debates have any genuine
resonance in national political debates across Europe?  Will its work be seen as relevant to,
and engaged with, contemporary European political issues, ranging from the ongoing and
developing challenges raised by September 11th, to issues of immigration, of internal
security, of employment, of globalisation?  And will there be seen to be a genuine process of
consultation and dialogue by the Convention?
The internal politics of the Convention are slowly unfolding, but it is too early to give any
definitive answers to these questions.  But whichever direction the Convention goes in, there
is widespread agreement that it must move beyond the debacle of Nice, if the enlarged EU is
to become a vital, dynamic and effective political body  (and, of course, ratification of Nice
still hangs on the outcome of the yet to be announced second Irish referendum).  So the
outcome of the Convention may be vital for the successful operation of the enlarged EU.
Without a positive outcome, the enlarged EU may rapidly find itself in a crisis situation (as
some, including Convention vice-chairman Jean-Luc Dehaene, argue) or, more likely perhaps
it may gradually start to seize up in its mechanisms and functioning - a gradual stasis.  What
is fundamental here is to identify and to unravel more clearly what the impact of enlargement
is likely to be and where the crucial areas for change are.  The process of the Convention itself
adds to our knowledge here: there is a chance to see for the first times the political dynamics
of the enlarged EU.
                                                
1 I am grateful to a number of  politicians, officials and commentators across the EU for discussing with me their
views on the future of Europe debate and the convention. Responsibility for views expressed here rests with the
author alone.KIRSTY HUGHES
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There is widespread agreement too on the need to tackle the democratic deficit - as Michel
Barnier, Commission representative on the Convention, has said 'until now we have built
Europe for the people but without them'.  But will the Convention be able to find new
solutions to this problem?  Or does it risk looking at solutions only in institutional and
constitutional terms, and not in terms of participation, communication and the development of
a European demos.  Certainly, the rhetoric around the EU as a federation of nation states,
which has found some favour in Convention debates, conceals for now some of the real
institutional power battles over the relative role of the Commission and Council and of the
larger and smaller countries. It is a concept, which can mean all things to all people and in
itself, provides no new answers. One crucial question for the enlarged EU, to which the
Convention should provide some answers, is whether it will be an EU dominated by the larger
member states - at the very time when the number of smaller member states doubles - an
outcome which is not likely to be politically stable or effective in the medium run.
Convention debates so far have also shown strong support in principle for the urgent need to
build a much stronger common foreign policy - with many referring to the current Middle
East crisis, and the EU's relative powerlessness to impact on events, as demonstrating the
need for new steps forward.  But the Convention will be challenged indeed to come up with a
clear route ahead in this area that will be commensurate with the urgency of the current range
of international problems, given national differences and the reluctance to pool sovereignty in
these areas.
It is too early to predict success or failure - or the direction of the final outcomes - of the
Convention.  But it is possible to distinguish a number of models or scenarios (developed
further in the conclusion) that may finally result from the twin processes of the Convention
and IGC:
•  Emergent global political power;
•  Struggling global power;
•  Efficient but weak EU
•  Efficient but unstable EU
•  Technocratic, stalled and inefficient EU.
This paper first assesses the political dynamics of the Convention so far, and then analyses the
key issues posed by the challenges of enlargement, of democracy, and of becoming a genuine
global actor. The paper does not look in detail at specific policy areas, such as economic
cooperation or justice and home affairs.
2. Politics of the Convention
At the time of writing (May 2002), the internal political dynamics of the Convention are still
developing.  It is too early to identify definitively where the main power centre(s) will lie, or
what the main divisions of opinion will be but some trends and groupings are emerging
already.
One crucial area, where there appears to have been understanding and broad agreement from
the start, is the need for the Convention to aim at a consensus document and to avoid a final
report containing lists of options on all key issues (it is relevant to note that when GiscardTHE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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d'Estaing made his opening speech to the Convention, it was this point that provoked
sustained spontaneous applause from the floor of the Convention).  A consensus outcome, in
the context of a wider public debate around the Convention, will make it very difficult for
member states to ignore or reject the principal conclusions in the subsequent 2004 IGC.  It
may be unlikely that a strong consensus can be gained on all major issues, but the aim will be
to limit the number of cases where alternate points of view are present in the text (and to
avoid any separate minority reports), although some are in favour of presenting options for
selection by the IGC in some areas.  However, even within the presidium it appears to be
unclear for now what sort of final text will be produced – whether in the form of a new Treaty
or a political document.
In general, member states would prefer to see more options in the conclusions rather than
consensus, to increase their room for manoeuvre in the IGC - but a number of appointed
senior political figures as government representatives on the Convention, implicitly
recognising the potential power of the Convention's output.  The UK initially talked
emphatically about the need for a ‘firebreak’ between the Convention and the IGC, but then,
in recognition of the potential power of the Convention appointed their Europe minister as
government representative – as did France. Also Portugal has emphasized the need for the
Convention to provide options.  Germany, in contrast, appears to be more ready for the
Convention to play a significant role, even if also nervous of the potential loss of political
initiative by the governments.
For the candidate countries, there appears to be less innate suspicion of the Convention vis-à-
vis the IGC - not least, perhaps, because of the political opportunities it offers them.  Of
considerable political importance for the candidates is their participation in the Convention on
an equal basis; and, while Laeken stated that the candidates could not prevent a consensus
among the current 15 at the Convention, any final conclusion that divided the current
members from the candidates would represent a failure of the process. The candidates’
representatives have already demonstrated both political determination and effectiveness by
successfully arguing for a candidate representative on the presidium (referred to by  Giscard
d'Estaing as a 'guest to the presidium') and for the possibility of using their own languages to
address the convention (both points on which Giscard was reluctant to concede).  The three
candidates not in the group of 10 currently expected to accede in 2004, notably Turkey, are
also treating the Convention as an important political opportunity to demonstrate their
political seriousness about, and involvement in, the European integration process.
Political Alignments
Many different actual and potential groupings and alignments exist in the Convention.  The
relative role and power of the chairman, the secretariat, the presidium, and the ordinary
Convention members represent one key aspect of the political dynamics that are developing.
But other groupings have also emerged: government representatives are meeting as a group,
as are the candidate members; the MEPs meet as a group but also organize meetings of the
three main political groupings, open to other members of the Convention; and some members
are meeting in national groupings.  Beyond this other alignments of member states'
government representatives, and of Convention members according to positions on key
issues, can be expected - the UK, for example, has already announced its intention for its
representative to co-operate with the Italian representative (an unlikely pairing of  Hain withKIRSTY HUGHES
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Fini).  National MPs are also developing as a group with some shared interests, not least in
their relative lack of contact with EU institutions.
How these different political dynamics develop will be fundamental in determining the nature
of the final output of the Convention.  Some are concerned that Giscard intends to dictate the
key elements of the final document, working closely with the secretariat led by John  Kerr
(former head of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office - proposed for the post by
Pierre de Boissieu, deputy secretary-general of the Council), and in close consultation with
key member states (not least to ensure that the heart of his proposals are then adopted by the
member states, ensuring that the Convention - and Giscard - are seen as the designers of the
future EU) .Others expect the presidium to play the key role, developing and putting forward
proposals to the Convention as a whole.  But so far there is little evidence that the presidium
is developing into a cohesive political grouping, with some tensions between Giscard and the
presidium.  No minutes are published of the presidium discussions but it appears that in the
first three months they have been more organizational than substantive, with attempts now
being made to move the meetings onto more substantive issues and to try to make the
presidium more politically operational.
So far, the wider Convention also demonstrates a reluctance to give a clear leadership role to
the presidium.  Over 300 amendments were received from members of the Convention to the
rules of procedure on the working methods of the Convention, put forward by Giscard.  Some
members of the Convention, such as the British MEP Andrew Duff (vice president of the
MEPs grouping on the Convention), are determined that power will remain with members of
the Convention - Duff himself already having drafted some proposed new Treaty articles.
Such political manoeuvring will continue, but success of the Convention will require the
construction of a certain degree of trust between the wider Convention, the presidium and the
secretariat. The Convention is clearly a highly political body and any simple top-down
approach will not be effective.
In order to try to dissipate some of the fears of a top-down approach, the secretariat and
presidium initially planned to have a 'listening phase' of the Convention through its first few
months of operation to the summer of 2002, before moving to detailed issue papers and
working groups in the autumn.  But while such a listening phase is under way, a growing
appreciation within the Convention both of the magnitude of the task and of the limitations of
debate within the Convention as a whole, as a tool for going into detail on subjects, led by the
start of May to the announcement of the establishment of six working groups (on subsidiarity,
the charter of fundamental rights, the legal personality of the EU, EU competences, role of
national parliaments, and economic and financial cooperation). These groups should make
short reports between September and November, with further groups to be created in the
future (including on foreign affairs).  Working groups will be composed of members of the
Convention selected according to their expertise but also reflecting in each group the overall
balance and composition of the Convention. Given their more detailed mandates, the working
groups will become one more crucial political player in the process (it is as yet unclear if the
groups will meet in public). Complaints have also been made by Convention members to
Giscard at his intention to use presidium members to chair all six first working groups (by a
group of Finnish, Austrian, Danish and Luxembourg members) – a further example of the
ongoing manoeuvring for political advantage. As the Convention’s work and political
dynamics unfold and clarify, greater coherence is likely to develop in its debates, operating
procedures and also in the main lines of division and difference. But in these early stages, all
players are trying to understand the complex political dynamics and their key implications.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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Substantive Views
In terms of balance of views within the Convention on the substance of institutional and
policy change and development, it is relatively early for an in-depth assessment.  In terms of
general aims and issues, some broad areas of agreement are emerging in initial Convention
debates - notably on issues such as the need to strengthen common foreign and security
policy, to strengthen policies in the justice and home affairs area, to enhance economic policy
coordination, to tackle issues around democratic legitimacy, and to promote clearer processes
for the application of subsidiarity.  Initial debates have shown very little support for any
repatriation of  competences or for drawing up a precise list of  competences. Clearer
differences of view emerge in areas such as social policy and building a stronger social
Europe.  Although Giscard in his comments at the meeting on the 15 April suggested noone
was arguing to increase competences in the social domain, this seems to be contradicted by
speeches calling for a stronger social Europe.  But detailed debates on institutional changes,
and on key issues such as the relative powers and role of the Council and Commission, have
yet to take place.
Of course, the broad, and sometimes detailed, positions of the existing member states are
mostly rather well known. But particularly among the largest four member states, European
policies are currently in a state of some flux and confusion.  In Italy, the  Berlusconi
government has broken with the long Italian positions of strong integrationist support for the
EU, but the outlines of what will be key new positions are unclear.  In France, the elections,
and the preceding period of cohabitation – together with France’s weakening position in a
wider EU, combine to give much less clarity than normal to its approach.  Elections in
Germany are similarly, if not to the same degree, blurring some of its policy lines, while in
the UK the potential euro referendum in 2003 is colouring all its policies and statements.
The UK (as discussed further below) did move rather early in advance of the Convention in
February to put forward new proposals suggesting the creation of an executive council within
the Council.  The UK is clearly hoping that it will have more support among member states
for its more  intergovernmentalist approach than in recent IGCs - in particular from Italy,
Spain, Sweden, Denmark and probably France.
Some of the UK's ideas were reflected in the paper from the Council secretariat to the
Barcelona summit on Council reform.  A further more detailed secretariat paper will go to the
Seville Council.  This underlines the existence of yet another political dynamic around the
Convention -member states, and the Council secretariat, moving to see what Council reform
can go ahead without Treaty reform, driven in part by the implicit threat that if they do not
make decisions now the Convention may put forward alternative proposals.  Although more
substantive proposals and changes, such as reform of the presidency, require Treaty change,
any agreement by the European Council on the desired direction and details of such reform
could impact strongly on, and effectively pre-empt, the Convention. The European Council
having given a mandate to the Convention, would effectively be trying to reclaim part of it.
Civil Society Relations
In one other area of its work, relations with civil society through the so-called Forum, the
picture also looks mixed.  Convention vice-chairman, Jean-Luc  Dehaene has been given
overall responsibility for relations with civil society. The Convention has set up a Forum web
site for debate and for written contributions, which at various points the secretariat will aimKIRSTY HUGHES
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summarise and synthesise.  Various dialogues are also developing between Dehaene and other
members of the presidium and different civil society groups and networks including networks
of  NGOs and networks of think tanks. Civil society hearings, and a youth Convention
mirroring the actual Convention, are planned for the June and July.  Ecosoc - an observer at
the Convention - has also been charged with a role in facilitating these dialogues.  Meanwhile
Convention members are encouraged to support and develop national debates in their
respective countries and to report back on developments.  The Convention session at the end
of June will focus on civil society and allow civil society representatives to address the
convention and to organise meetings and discussions around the Convention meeting within
the European Parliament.
The big questions here are three-fold: the extent of the debate, and the range of groups
involved across the member states and candidate countries; the extent to which this debate can
be sufficiently structured, so that clear messages and points of view come through, and
crucially, the extent to which the Convention is seen to be genuinely open to the wider civil
debate that will surround its activities, at least to some degree.  The jury is still out on these
questions but there are rumblings of discontent from some  NGOs and it is questionable
whether the Convention has either the political will or the resources, not least in its
secretariat, to listen to and take on board this debate. Nonetheless, the June hearings and
Convention meeting are an important step forward.  The lack of representativeness of the
Convention, most notably in its pitiful proportion of women members, is one further reason
why an effective public debate is so important.
As discussed further below, the process of the Convention especially in its relation with the
wider political and public debates is of considerable importance.  If the process of public
consultation and debate is seen as inadequate, just a process of tokenism, this may impact
strongly and negatively on the wider reception of the final output of the Convention.  If the
output is seen to be a European constitution produced by an elite, it may have an entirely
contrary impact on legitimacy, and the development of the European political space, to that
intended. Avoiding this outcome means reaching beyond organised civil society to the wider
public.
 Politics of the Convention – Summary of  Key Issues
•  Nature of the final document – constitutional treaty or political text. Consensus or division
– and extent of options presented (member states prefer options);
•  New political dynamics of the enlarged EU emerging – and political opportunity for
Bulgaria, Romania and especially Turkey; candidate countries push successfully for
representative on presidium and for use of own languages;
•  Complexity of developing political alignments and groupings – relative positions and
roles of the chair (Giscard), secretariat, presidium, Convention; range of groups meeting –
governments’ representatives, national MPs,  MEPs, political parties, national groups,
candidate countries etc;
•  Presidium not yet developing identity as a political team;THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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•  Top-down or bottom up approach – wider Convention has many suspicions of presidium
and chair, some tensions evident;
•  First working groups established – important political players;
•  General support for strengthening common foreign and security policy and justice and
home affairs, for enhancing economic policy  coordination, and for strengthening
democratic legitimacy – more differences on social Europe; little support for repatriation
of competences or for lists of competences;
•  Civil society relations – importance of wide-ranging debate around the Convention, with
genuine access and input into the Convention – some criticisms and doubts from NGOs.
3. The Impact of Enlargement
The current timetable for enlargement, according to the EU road map, is for negotiations with
the front-runners to conclude by the end of 2002, with entry by early 2004 before the
European parliamentary elections.  At present, a 'big bang' enlargement of 10 new members is
anticipated.  But there are various hurdles still to clear.  The detailed negotiations on the
budgetary, agricultural and structural funds chapters will only take place in autumn 2002 -
and could easily run beyond the end of year deadline.  Cyprus is another potential stumbling
block where, if current negotiations for a political settlement on the island fail, the EU will
have to take the final decision to admit Cyprus without such a settlement.  Meanwhile, there is
no firm indication yet whether and when Ireland will hold another referendum on the Nice
Treaty, though it is anticipated for autumn 2002, and with no guarantee that the Irish will, on
a second vote, deliver a positive answer.
If the Nice Treaty is not ratified, then there are essentially two routes forward: firstly to
include the key elements of Nice for enlargement in each accession treaty, or secondly to
postpone enlargement until the work of the Convention and 2004 IGC is completed.  The
latter solution would cause major political difficulties in relations between the EU and
candidates, and impact strongly on political attitudes and debates within each candidate
country.  Some are concerned that the current rightward shift in EU politics in recent national
elections might encourage a delay in enlargement – this might be most likely to come to the
fore, if major problems arise such as failure to ratify Nice.
Even if all the above hurdles are safely cleared, it is also not guaranteed that all the candidates
will then get approval of their publics in referenda for accession.  Nonetheless, despite these
uncertainties, the most likely scenario at present is for an enlargement by up to ten countries
by 2004 (with further candidates queuing up behind).  This would also mean that the 2004
IGC would be held at 25 not at 15 (if the IGC started before all accession treaties were
ratified, then candidates might initially participate as observers, but becoming full members of
the IGC before it concluded).
Coalitions and Large and Small Countries
The fundamental problem for the enlarged EU is how to manage the increased numbers and
diversity that the Union will contain.  Problems of efficiency and political interaction already
exist at 15.  But the new enlargement of the EU presages a major change in politicalKIRSTY HUGHES
8
dynamics, which may impact on all aspects of EU policy-making, policy instruments and
institutional organisation and behaviour.  The political balances - and bargains - across
different policy and institutional areas will change.  The range and variety of alliance and
coalition formation will increase considerably.  Uncertainty and guesswork already
characterise the political interaction at 15, but the uncertainty at 25 will increase further,
impacting negatively on effective and coherent decision-making.  There will be a rapid
increase in knowledge of the new members’ main policy positions, key interests and
bargaining behaviour after enlargement (and before, not least through the dynamics of the
convention as well as through analysis of their policy positions and structural interests).  But
this increased knowledge will not fully compensate for the range of alliances and coalitions
that will be feasible across all EU decision-making – not least when cross-bargains and deals
in the current EU already make tracing the full details of coalitions and positions, on any
political or policy decision, very difficult.
One of the key characteristics of the enlarged EU will be that it is essentially a small country
EU - the number of ' bigs' will increase only from five to six (as Poland joins France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK) while the number of 'smalls' will increase from 10 to 19.
At the same time, the proportion of the EU's population represented by the 'bigs' will remain
roughly stable at about two-thirds of the total.  With the increase in number of the smaller
countries, the importance of ensuring that the EU continues to respect the sovereignty and
voice of all – and not simply of the large countries – is highly pertinent.
The enlarged EU is a small country EU: it needs to function in such a way that the smaller
countries continue to have a genuine voice and input and continue to benefit from the pooling
of sovereignty.  But the risk is that the enlarged EU may become a big country EU. Certainly,
there will be pressures, explicit and implicit, from some of the larger countries for more
centralization of EU leadership around them, and in some cases for an implicit directoire (at
present the strongest tendencies in this direction are coming from the UK, not least with its
proposals to strengthen the Council at the expense of the Commission - given the UK's
normal ultra-sensitivity over EU centralization, it is a little ironic to see its policies tending
towards the aim of centralization around the 'bigs').
Revisiting Nice and Majority Voting
The small country-large country dilemma is one reason, though not the only one, why
revisiting the voting weights agreed at Nice would be desirable.  Nice had various adverse
effects on the voting system: it increased the weight of the larger countries and increased the
threshold for a qualified majority vote. This  will reduce the influence of smaller countries
without making it easier for the ‘bigs’ to get agreement – what it facilitates in various ways is
blocking decision-making.  With its three criteria for achieving a majority (reaching the
qualified majority vote bar at 74% of the total, a majority of member states and at least 62%
of the population) it also reduces transparency and simplicity, while increasing the ease and
range of means of getting a blocking minority.  Larger countries will find it easier to block,
noone will find it easier to reach decisions.
This counter-productive agreement needs to be scrutinised by the Convention and alternative
ideas put forward (without underestimating the strength of the political power play and
bargaining that got to the Nice agreement in the first place).  The most obvious and simple
alternative that the Convention could consider is the proposal for a simple double majority
voting system. Based on a dual majority of population and of countries, the simple doubleTHE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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majority system not only neatly balances the issues of size versus sovereignty, but also has the
considerable advantage of transparency and simplicity.  Furthermore, since enlargement also
raises the need to consider further extension of qualified majority voting, a voting system that
is simple, balanced and easily understandable becomes ever more important.  Without an
extension of QMV, the EU risks blockage through national vetoes, but extension of QMV can
impact on existing problems of democratic inadequacy and distance of EU institutions.  This
also argues, therefore, for an extension of co-decision with the EP.  Consequently efficiency
solutions and democratic solutions have to be considered in the light of their impact on each
other and not separately.
Competences
This is also the case for other aspects of institutional change under discussion.  Finding
clearer and simpler processes for the application of  subsidiarity, and for the sharing of
competences between the EU and the member states is needed in the current EU, but becomes
yet more urgent in a system where each individual country will have a smaller voice in a
larger total of voices and votes.  Yet, as the Convention has already debated, the prospects for
defining a clear list of competences are low, in particular since most competences are shared,
but also because competences evolve.  So clarity and simplicity has to come through the
procedures and definitions rather than through any lists.  This is one area in particular, where
new potential roles for national parliaments are being closely examined.  The European
Commission (Com (2002) 247) proposes an approach focusing on the intensity of application
of the competence – whether, for example, an area of competence requires harmonisation or
simply coordination – together with a rationalisation of the range of tools and approaches that
can be used.
Since most competences are shared, but in a wide variety of different ways, the question of
the nature or type of policy instruments available also becomes important in encouraging
subsidiarity and proportionality. Enlargement can impact here too.  Thus, for example,
through the Lisbon process more emphasis has been put on the potential utility of so-called
open coordination processes, particularly in areas that are important or sensitive for national
sovereignty such as aspects of social policy.  While the effectiveness and value of these open
coordination processes is anyway open to doubt - with their mixture of exchange of best
practice, peer pressure and in some cases common guidelines and recommendations – the
increase in numbers that will come with enlargement may considerably complicate their
functioning.  Trying to agree 'soft' frameworks that will fit 25 countries will be more difficult,
and the effectiveness of peer pressure on those 'laggards' furthest from meeting the guidelines
may fall as the number and variety of laggards increases.
Changing Economic and Political Geography
Enlargement also brings with it a new political and economic geography of the EU as well as
a new configuration and diversity of economic and social development levels.  These changes
raise a variety of questions for policy development.
The geographical expansion of the EU shifts both borders and the centre of gravity of the EU
sharply eastwards.  From extended borders with Russia, through new borders with Ukraine
down to the Balkans, plus the southern expansion to Cyprus and Malta, the EU has to contend
in economic, political, diplomatic and security terms with a range of new neighbours.  Even
after a ‘big bang’ enlargement it also still has 3 remaining current candidates – Bulgaria,KIRSTY HUGHES
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Romania and Turkey, with others, such as Croatia, likely to join the list soon.  The new
member states already have a range of links and interactions and political and policy views on
relations with the new neighbours.  These policy views of the new member states are not
identical with those of existing EU member states - just as those current EU member states
that border the candidate countries have tended to have both stronger political and economic
interests in enlargement, as well as, in some cases, stronger concerns over issues such as
labour migration.
This new shape of the enlarged EU will impact on policy debate and development in a range
of areas from foreign policy, to immigration policies, internal security, and trade and
investment links.  Whatever role the EU succeeds in developing in global foreign policy, after
enlargement the EU will directly face considerable responsibilities and policy questions in its
role as a regional economic and political power.  Current debates within Europe over internal
security and terrorism on the one hand and over immigration, and the focus of the extreme
right on immigration, on the other hand, raise the possibility of the EU moving towards a
more defensive, 'fortress Europe' approach.  But political and economic needs and pressures
point in the other direction towards a well-managed set of economic, political and security
relations across the new EU borders - in a way that should be, though may not be,
complementary to the enlargement and development of  NATO's relations with countries
beyond the EU.
Developing EU policy positions and approaches to manage these relations successfully will
require, especially in justice and home affairs, stronger and more coherent EU policies and
competences (such as in the proposal for a common EU border guard).  The Convention so far
has not addressed these issues in any detail, but has recognised in its debates the importance
of moving forward in the justice and home affairs area as well as in CFSP.  Further proposals
on policy competences and instruments in this area will be particularly important. But the
Convention is not working in a static environment – this is an area of major current political
activity for the EU and so the goalposts are shifting.
The enlarged EU will also have a much wider diversity in levels of economic development.
This not only points towards the need for a redefinition and development of structural and
cohesion policy, together with a new balance of interests around the structural funds, and the
CAP, it also indicates a new pattern of views on economic and social policy development.
The candidate countries cannot be treated in any sense as a group here: just as with the
existing member states, there are a range of views on economic policy, liberalisation, and the
role of European social policy.  From their experiences of transition, many have moved quite
far in terms of liberalisation.  But there is a range of interests - business, union, NGO, etc - in
each country, together with a range of public and popular views, which will impact on the
positions taken by the new member states once they join, and which will relate, in part, to the
level of economic development and the speed and extent of convergence. While Estonia, for
example, may be positioned fairly closely to member states like the UK in terms of attitudes
to liberalisation and free market approaches, other candidates will have views and policy
approaches that may take them closer to a position similar to Germany, others to France, to
Portugal, etc.  And these positions will vary by policy area - many expect Poland to share
interests with Spain after accession, particularly with respect to the structural funds and
agriculture, but in other areas of economic policy and liberalisation, it may end up positioned
somewhere between the UK and Germany.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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With the current enlargement timetable, the EU will also have to face up to this range of
views as it agrees its post-2006 budget.  In terms of budget debates, the EU will face a new
North-South-East triangle which will expand the traditional dynamics of the budget debates,
from the fundamental split between net contributors and net recipients, particularly the current
cohesion four, to the new net recipients of Central and Eastern Europe - who may or not find
ways to make common cause with the current net recipients.  In 2006, a full-scale review of
the CAP is also due, where a range of new alliances may be anticipated, not least between
France and Poland.
The Convention does not have the future budget as part of its tasks.  But its debates around
economic and social policy competences and the need, or otherwise, for greater economic
policy coordination in the EU will highlight and provide more information on the economic
policy positions and potential alliances in the enlarged EU. More importantly perhaps, while
it is not the job of the Convention to design a new structural and regional policy, it is open to
the Convention to make some clear statements about the need for solidarity and cohesion in
the enlarged EU and the key values, as well as competence, needed at EU level to encourage
and underpin such solidarity.  While it may be relatively easy to get broad support for the
general principle of solidarity, unpacking the concept into general policies and competences
could prove controversial.
Candidates' common interests in the Convention
As the above discussion makes clear, while there is no reason to expect common positions
across the board from the candidates, either in the Convention or subsequently as new
member states, there is also likely to be a number of policy areas, such as the budget and the
structural funds, where considerable commonality may be found, particularly amongst the
candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe.  It is too early in the Convention debates
to identify the extent of commonality but there are a number of broad issues and areas where
potential similarities of view can be identified a priori.
In terms of the original motivations for the candidate countries to join the EU, political
motivations have been central.  There is a strong understanding of the EU, and of membership
of the EU, as having fundamental political drivers and implications.  In this sense, the
candidates are very similar to Spain, Portugal and Greece, who while standing to gain
economically from joining the EU, also saw the political importance of being full members of
the EU, not least in underpinning their own democratic development.  This is then a very
different enlargement to the more economically driven motivations behind the accession of
countries such as the UK, Denmark and Sweden.  The candidates have an interest in a strong
political Europe, and not simply in an economic association.
Given the experiences in the candidate countries of central and eastern Europe of political
transition and the establishment of democracy - and to reinforce those structures - they also
have an interest in a clear articulation of democratic processes and decision-making in the EU,
and not in the establishment of a  directoire approach (not least since most are smaller
countries).  This does not mean all the candidates will support a strongly integrationist or
federalist approach - and a range of views can be seen to be emerging here, with Hungary
perhaps as one of the more integrationist minded, and Estonia at the other end of the
spectrum.  But it does mean a general interest in effective political integration in areas where
pooling sovereignty is a positive-sum game - and a relative absence of the deep suspicion of
integration in some existing EU member states, notably Denmark, Sweden and the UK.  TheirKIRSTY HUGHES
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experience of the Cold War and of superpower politics may also cut in different directions –
leading, on the one hand, to an appreciation of the importance of having a strong political
voice at the European level but, on the other hand, to an emphasis on the importance of
effective democratic processes for controlling that political voice and maintaining the role of
national sovereignty.  Candidate country members of the Convention have spoken out clearly
in favour of a stronger foreign policy.
Given the political motivations for accession and the experiences of political transition since
1989, together with the evidence of the ongoing negotiations, it is also clear that the
candidates will avoid and oppose any institutional and policy developments that will involve
placing them in any 'second-class member' status - whether as new members or as smaller
countries.  This will impact on a range of positions (although in exactly what form has yet to
be seen), such as on the role of the Council and the Commission, or on economic policy
coordination in the context of the euro. On the latter, the Commission has proposed the
formalisation of the role of the eurogroup – a development which could have many further
implications for differential policy formulation within and outside of the  eurogroup, and
which the candidates will view with concern.
As mostly smaller countries, the candidates may - like most of the current smaller EU
member states - support a strong role for the Commission as being in their interests;
nonetheless, their determination to avoid anything that looks like second-class status, may
imply a reluctance to see a smaller Commission even though a Commission of 25 or more
members will be weaker.  They will have to face up at some point to this fundamental
contradiction.  Equally, they may be suspicious of any Council reforms, particularly to the
Presidency, that may weaken their participation.
The candidates' experiences of democratic transition, and the relative newness to them of EU
structures, may also make them more open to - and more likely to come forward with - more
radical proposals and solutions for democratising and opening up the EU, including in terms
of transparency, simplicity, participation and legitimacy. Their fresh experience of
redesigning and re-establishing political systems should also mean that the idea of building a
European constitution or constitutional text is seen as a positive and necessary approach
rather than in any way threatening. Finally, while a range of attitudes to economic and social
policy is clearly visible in the candidates' current national policies, considerable consensus
can be expected on positive solidarity and cohesion policies.
In summary, areas of likely common interest or consensus among the candidates include the
following:
•  A strong political Europe and not just an economic Europe
•  Making the EU a strong regional actor and a stronger global actor
•  Clearer articulation of democratic processes and decision-making, strong measures to
improve transparency, participation and legitimacy
•  Support for establishing a European constitutional textTHE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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•  Positive approach to the potential benefits in key areas from pooling sovereignty and
further integration
•  Opposition to a directoire approach
•  Opposition to a two-speed Europe
•  Support for solidarity and cohesion policies
•  Support for the Commission but support for a large Commission.
Enlargement – Summary of Key Issues
•  Increased numbers and diversity – democratic and efficiency challenges; greater range and
variety of potential alliances and coalitions increasing uncertainty;
•  Enlarged EU is a small country EU (19 smalls to 6 bigs at 25) but risks being run as a big
country EU;
•  Revisit Nice voting weights – double-majority voting as the solution;
•  Extend QMV and co-decision for improved efficiency and democracy;
•  Clarify allocation of competences and application of  subsidiarity – new processes not
lists;
•  Effectiveness of some instruments may change with greater numbers – open coordination
processes may become weaker;
•  Changing economic and political geography – implications for many policies; EU needs
to be a regional power; new emphasis on solidarity and cohesion needed;
•  Candidates have some common interests in the Convention – including support for a
politically strong EU, EU as a regional power, opposition to a directoire approach and to a
two-speed EU.
4. The Democratic Problem
The EU faces a number of serious inadequacies in its democratic functioning - these
inadequacies exist both in its structures and in its operations.  As the Laeken declaration said
"the Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient"; it went
on to emphasise the need to bring its citizens "closer to the European design and institutions".
Many of the democratic inadequacies are difficult to resolve in their entirety, precisely
because of the unique nature of the EU construction and the fact that the EU is not a state and
it has no government.  Relatedly, there is no pan-European public or demos and no European
political space comparable to national political arenas and debates.KIRSTY HUGHES
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Consequently, even the European Parliament - in structural terms, the most democratic of the
EU institutions - faces legitimacy problems, not only related to issues around levels of turnout
in parliamentary elections, but also particularly related to lack of visibility, knowledge and
awareness among EU citizens.  For the Council and Commission the difficulties are greater.
The Council is democratic in the sense that any intergovernmental body (of democracies) is
democratic - it is composed of ministerial representatives of currently elected governments.
But the Council as a whole is not elected as a pan-European body and it does not begin to
resemble a representative EU government.  Furthermore, while it shares many legislative
powers with the European Parliament, it is not fully accountable to that body and currently
exercises those powers in private together with its executive powers, while national
parliaments can only hold individual national members of the Council to account and not the
whole Council.
The Commission, with its own executive powers and right of initiative, faces particular
problems in that its members are all appointed not elected (even if many were previously
national politicians); but, unlike the Council, it is in a position to take a pan-European view, at
least in theory, independent of national interests.  The EP exercises some important scrutiny
and accountability powers over the Commission but, overall, issues remain both of the
political accountability and  representativeness of Commissioners and,  relatedly, of their
political control over the bureaucracy.
These democratic inadequacies exist independently of the enlargement of the EU.  But
through the increase in number of member states, enlargement risks increasing the public
perception of distance from, and loss of control of, EU institutions: pooling sovereignty at 6 is
clearly not the same as pooling sovereignty at 25 or more.  There is also an important link
between the health and vitality of democratic processes in the member states and those at EU
level.  Thus, the current democratic malaise in many of the EU member states, linked to, and
reflected in, falling voter turnout, falling trust in politicians, a variety of corruption scandals
and, more recently, the rise of the extreme right, impacts on the EU, in particular through the
Council, since EU citizens are unlikely to place more trust in the Council than they do in the
national politicians that represent them there.  This problem is then aggravated when national
politicians turn round and blame Brussels, or the Commission, for policy decisions or
communication failures (as done most recently by Schroeder, linked clearly to the German
election campaign) rather than acknowledging, explaining and defending the decisions and
systems to which they are party.
The Convention has as yet only debated these issues in the broadest terms, although with
much support as would be expected for the general goal of bringing the EU closer to the
citizens.  This notwithstanding a curious intervention from Giscard in the Convention's April
meeting where he emphasised the contradiction involved in trying to bring the EU closer to
the citizens as it is, he said, by definition the most distant level of government.  The emphasis,
he considers, should be on comprehensibility – closeness to the citizen can be satisfied by
other levels of government, local and national and only very little by the European level.  This
seems a rather inadequate response to the  Laeken challenge as set by the member states.
Action is needed not only to make the EU more comprehensible, but also more transparent,
more representative and more participative - with the last two of these characteristics in many
ways the most challenging.  Some would also include increasing efficiency as in part a further
element of improving democracy - although the argument that citizens are only interested in
efficiency, in 'delivery', is an argument that at best abandons the attempt, at the start, to
improve democracy and at worst is fundamentally antidemocratic.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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Several of the issues under discussion, or on the agenda of the Convention, impact on these
different aspects of democratic functioning.  A clear and simple constitution together with
clear, effective procedures for allocation of  competences and the implementation of
subsidiarity, could impact strongly on both comprehensibility and transparency.  Proposals
already under discussion within the Council to hold legislative sessions in public would also
represent a leap forward on the transparency side.  But the representative and participative
dimensions are more difficult and relate strongly to how the roles and structures of the
Council and Commission are developed, as well as to the role of national parliaments.
Council versus Commission
Both the Council and Commission need reform in their own right, in both efficiency and
democratic terms, but one of the key questions for the Convention and subsequent IGC, is that
of the relative balance between the executive powers of the Council versus those of the
Commission.  It is the ongoing fight over whether the EU develops in an intergovernmental or
supranational direction and decisions taken in this key area will impact on many other aspects
of EU development.  Some of those arguing in favour of a stronger Council, notably the UK
who took a lead in making early proposals here, emphasise that in their view the Council is
not only more democratic than the Commission but, according to the UK's foreign secretary
Jack Straw, that it is where democratic accountability lies 'first and foremost'.  Despite some
lip service to the role of the Commission, it is clear that the UK would like to see the EU
move in a much more intergovernmental direction with the Commission increasingly
fulfilling the role of a secretariat.
Apart from the democratic deficiencies of the Council discussed above, the main difficulty
with this approach lies with the fact that the Commission, as a supranational body, is designed
to take a pan-European view, while the Council consists of the individual national views
aggregated through intergovernmental debate.  Larger member states also dominate in the
Council, which is why the smaller member states have tended to be strong defenders of the
role of the Commission.  Many observers do see the balance of power as already shifting from
Commission to Council, partly reflecting weak leadership in the former (leaders chosen by the
Council), but also representing more fundamental trends in EU development, including
increased focus on areas sensitive to national sovereignty.
Council Reform
Several of the proposals for Council reform may impact on this balance.  The European
Council at Barcelona discussed a paper from the Council secretariat focusing in particular on
reform of the European Council, of the General Affairs Council, and of the presidency,
together with the issue of legislating in public.  A number of decisions on Council reform may
be taken at the Seville Council - those that require Treaty change may be forwarded to the
Convention as a contribution of the European Council, a contribution that will be difficult to
ignore.
A EU President and Executive Council?
 The UK first started to float a number of ideas on Council reform behind the scenes at the
start of the year, bringing some of them into the light of day in a speech by the British Foreign
Secretary (the Hague, 21 February 2002) just before the start of the Convention.  It is
interesting to note that some of the British ideas that have been floated, but were not spelt outKIRSTY HUGHES
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in detail by Jack Straw, have also been picked up in the Council secretariat contribution to
Barcelona – the extent of collaboration between the UK and the Council secretariat is unclear,
but looks to be rather close.  Ideas on a EU President were subsequently also followed by
Jacques Chirac and Jose Maria Aznar.
One part of the UK proposal is the idea of creating, in effect, an executive council of the
Council to replace the current presidency.  Under this proposal, the number of Council
formations would be reduced to fewer than 10.  Each Council would appoint a chairperson for
two and a half years instead of six months and that group of chair people would form an
executive council or steering group.
The Council secretariat also make explicit in their Barcelona note the idea only gently raised
in Jack Straw's speech (but floated informally by UK sources): to ‘elect’ – actually to appoint
– the president of the European Council by its members for a period substantially longer than
the current presidency length of six months, possiblytwo and a half years they suggest. Chirac
proposed at the start of March appointing the President of the Council for five years, an idea
given further publicity by Peter Hain, the UK’s Europe minister (in an interview with the FT,
6/02/02).  Spain has also come out in support of this idea, while the idea of an executive
council has attracted less attention.  Meanwhile, the smaller countries are concerned at the
proposal, with Finland criticising anything that would weaken the Commission.  The German
government has not commented, but MEP  Elmar  Brok at the May Convention meeting
lambasted the idea of a super-president, saying the choice was between “ Monnet and
Metternich”.
The proposal for a EU President neatly encapsulates the divisions over the relative powers of
the Council and Commission and of the intergovernmental versus supranational approach.  Its
supporters claim such a President would be more legitimate, overcome the problems of the
changing 6-month presidency and act as the central interlocutor for international dialogues.
But there are many problems with the proposal. Firstly, it is in fact identical to the situation of
the current Commission President, i.e. former head of state, appointed by the Council and for
a period of five years.  Yet, as many accept, there are problems of inadequate democratic
legitimacy of the Commission President (due to his appointment not election – as discussed
further below). But those supporting the new President idea would be unlikely to support any
reforms of the Commission President, which would demonstrate the democratic inadequacy
of their new European Council leader. Furthermore, although the proposal overcomes the
problem of the rotating presidency, the latter has the democratic advantage that it has at its
head an elected premier, not an appointed, former politician.  Moreover, confusion may be the
outcome if the EU has two Presidents both appointed in an identical manner.
On the international side, the new President would effectively replace the role of the current
High Representative though this has not been explicitly spelt out.  But  Solana’s
representativity as the international voice of the EU depends crucially on the member states
political willingness to allow him that voice – the same question, and problem, would exist
for a new EU President.  Finally, there may be coordination and liaison problems between EU
President and Commission, since the latter holds many of the relevant executive tools and
powers. The outcome could well be a very weak President not the new strong leader intended
by the larger countries supporting the idea.  Nonetheless, there is a strong risk that the UK,
France and Spain  - and possibly Italy - may bargain for this against, possibly, agreeing with
the smaller countries continued appointment by each member state of a Commissioner –
resulting in a weak Commission with weak Presidents of both Commission and Council.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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Various unanswered questions also face the idea of an executive Council chaired by the new
President.  How would equality across member states be assured? What happens to the
position of the long-standing (two and a half year or more) chairs of Councils when there are
elections and changes of government in member states?  What would be the role, if any, of
the Commission in the executive council/steering group?  But what is perhaps most striking
about this proposal is its parallelism to the Commission, particularly once taking into account
proposals for its reform.  A strong Commission, as many have argued, should have fewer
members, perhaps as few as 12, rather than a number equal to the number of member states.
Taken together, the two reform proposals would produce two remarkably similar looking
cross-portfolio executive bodies.
Two parallel executive structures may reinforce interinstitutional conflict not cooperation. In
such a situation, the Commission may also find itself very much the weaker body.
Furthermore, if such an executive council of the Council did become a dominant structure in
the EU, there is a serious risk that it would be relatively inefficient (since it would not be a
full-time executive), dominated by the larger countries, and tending towards some similarities
with the UN.  These weaknesses might be removed if such an executive council were
permanent and full-time, i.e. if its members stood down from their national political duties -
but this would be full circle back reinventing the Commission (although at that point the
reinvented ‘Commission’ would be at the heart of the Council – certainly not the outcome
intended by the intergovernmentalists). It is notable that the Commission (Com (2002)247)
does not engage directly with these arguments at all, leaving the question of the presidency to
one side while generally arguing for a stronger Commission in a variety of key areas.
While some of the smaller countries may continue to defend the six-month presidency, most
accept the need for change in an enlarged EU.  But if they are opposed to the new President
idea, alternatives are needed.  Other proposals for reform of the presidency have focused more
on the idea of a team presidency shared among a small number of member states.  The team
presidency approach would provide more continuity and consistency, and would also work as
some form of steering group, but without the strong executive council characteristics of the
UK's proposal.  But a team presidency also implies a head of the European Council in place
for more than six months.  The difference to the UK proposals would be that such a head of
the European Council would be an acting head of state, and so not a full time President, and a
team presidency is unlikely to last for five years.  This would conflict less with the position of
Commission President but it does also indicate that a higher profile – through longer length –
EU President in some form is a probable outcome. The relations of that President with the
Commission President and with the High Representative will need considerable further
definition.
The General Affairs Council – time for change
The choices over the presidency are strongly interrelated to other aspects of Council reform –
as well as to the role and reform of the Commission.  The inadequate functioning of the
General Affairs Council is another key area of debate here.  In different contributions to and
comments on the debates so far, there is a general recognition that the GAC is overloaded and
malfunctioning in its efforts to combine its general coordination roles with the foreign affairs
role.  One relatively straightforward part of a solution here is to create separate Foreign
Affairs Council - although less straightforward is who chairs it - the (reformed) presidency or
Solana?  But there are a variety of views of what then happens with the general coordinationKIRSTY HUGHES
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side of the GAC.  Does it continue in its current form or is a new formation of the Council
established?
Some have proposed a coordination Council composed possibly of deputy prime ministers or
European ministers.  But the politics of these different positions of deputy prime minister and
European minister vary considerably across member states, especially where there are
coalitions, and so a more acceptable solution is likely to be one where each prime minister
nominates their own choice of minister to such a coordination Council.  Such a Council might
meet on a frequent basis in Brussels.  While some have raised fears about how this could
relate to the meetings of officials in Coreper, a more substantial question is how such a
coordination Council would relate to an executive council or steering group if that were the
direction of reform of the presidency.  It is possible that these decisions may be taken
sequentially, since reform of the General Affairs Council does not require Treaty amendment,
whereas the substantive changes to the presidency proposed would require Treaty change.
Reforming the European Council
A further area of consideration for reform is the role of the European Council itself and how
to bring it more fully within the institutional structures of the Union.  The Council secretariat
suggest various procedural and organisational changes to improve the efficiency and focus of
European Council meetings, and re-establishing and re-emphasising its role in setting a
strategic framework for EU policy development.  The proposed changes range from
substantially reducing the size of delegations, to shorter more focused conclusions, and better
preparation of meetings, both through reform of the GAC and also through reduction in the
number of Council formations.  Ideas have also been floated to try to limit the use of
European Council as a decision-maker of last resort when individual Councils fail to reach
agreement, including the idea of using QMV in the European Council for areas where QMV
is used in the individual councils.  The relationship between the European Council and the
proposed executive council also needs further consideration - the European Council might
find its risk being upstaged by the executive council, particularly if it was chaired by a new,
longer term European Council president.
Many, but not all, of these Council reforms have implications for the balance of power
between Council and Commission.  Whichever way this balance shifts, it is unlikely to be
permanently settled since the EU is not at a stage where it will confer all its executive powers
on one institution.   With the exception of the proposal for the Council to legislate in public –
a vital step forward for transparency and accountability – the proposed Council changes,
including that of the new President, do not make any changes or improvements to
representativity. They also raise many questions that would have to be resolved about inter-
institutional relations and roles. In particular, the possibility of both European Council and
Commission having Presidents appointed in the same way for the same time period, both
potentially former premiers, raises more difficulties than it resolves.
But how the balance of power shifts will also depend on how the Commission is reformed.
The Commission itself is of course pursuing a number of internal reforms but the wider
debate around its role and structure has not yet been pursued within the Convention itself.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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Commission Reform
Much of the debate about Commission reform has focused on the two issues of the size of the
Commission and the potential election of its President.  The future size of the Commission is
fundamental, not simply to the efficiency with which it functions, but to the question of how it
fulfils its role of taking a coherent, pan-European approach to initiating policy and upholding
all existing rules and agreements (defending the Treaties).  The Commission at present looks
increasingly weak, with an absence of strategic leadership or strategic framework
underpinning the tendency of the current Commission to fragment into separate, relatively
uncoordinated policy domains, with varying degrees of political control by individual
commissioners over those policy domains and with a serious absence of genuine collegiality.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of the current internal reforms of the administration - the
bureaucracy - of the Commission has yet to be tested.  Whether it will really prove possible to
replace a system dominated by insider networks and national preference with one of
promotion on merit is open to considerable doubt.  But while success of these internal
administrative reforms is one vital component of ensuring the effectiveness and accountability
of a politically reformed Commission, they themselves do not impact directly on the lack of
political coordination and strategy, nor will they lead either to a substantial restructuring of
internal structures and resources.
Restricting the future size of the Commission is a key reform (ducked at Nice) to ensure
effective political direction and coordination.  A smaller Commission, probably around 12
commissioners, would contribute to ensuring:
•  Effective strategic policy leadership by the President and by the Commission as a whole;
•  Genuine joined-up policy management and development (i.e. real collegiality);
•  Pan-European policy-making not undermined by national influences;
•  Improved political accountability of the administration to the commissioners; and
•  Greater effectiveness of the Commission in interinstitutional discussions with the Council
and the Parliament.
To achieve these results also requires radical structural changes within the Commission,
reducing resources in less relevant areas (which returns to the issue of competences) and
reorganising resources and structures to ensure genuine strategic policy planning and
development.  This could also contribute to greater communication and  coordination of
strategic planning across the three institutions. In terms of strategic policy development, the
Commission's sole right of initiative is in fact already shared.  A better recognition of that by
improved joint coordination is not per se an attack on the Commission's remit.
Smaller countries – both member states and candidate countries – mostly support a strong role
for the Commission and so should support reform. But their reluctance to give up what they
see as their national commissioner may condemn the Commission to weakness and a failure
to fulfil its pan-European policy function, with infighting driven by national interests.KIRSTY HUGHES
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These reforms on their own, substantial and controversial though they are, are not sufficient
and will have to be complemented by reforms on the side of democratic accountability.
Attention has focused here on the question of electing the Commission President - either by a
genuine EU wide popular election or via election by the European Parliament.  The former
proposal - an EU wide election - is problematic due to the lack of a genuine or even emergent
pan-European political space, reflected in the weakness of  transnational parties and the
absence of a European demos or, relatedly, a European media. The alternative, which is a
more intermediate step of election by the EP, is a preferable proposal in that it balances the
need for more democratic accountability with the difficulties raised by the inadequate
development of the European public space.
Some are concerned that such an election process might unnecessarily politicise the
Commission and would undermine its collegiality.  But there are various possible routes
around this problem.  The President might be elected from a list provided by the European
Council, and there is no reason why this list should necessarily provide a choice of candidates
across the political parties.  Moreover, the European Parliament could commit to making this
a free vote and to identifying criteria for preference among candidates relating to key
European priorities and not to party affiliation.  This proposal could and should be taken
further: it could be applied to the selection of all commissioners.  And if the latter is a step too
far, then the Parliament should at least have the right to endorse or reject individual
commissioners and not simply the whole Commission.  Without such a step forward, the
Commission will remain insufficiently accountable.  In such a new framework not only would
its role be clear and more transparent and accountable, but such a new system should also
strengthen the political control of the commissioners over the administration itself, another
fundamental requirement of reform.
In the absence of such changes, it is almost inevitable that the political balance will shift
towards the Council, as it will become increasingly difficult to justify a major political role
for an unreformed Commission.  But if the Council agrees to appoint a new European Council
President, then it will be highly unlikely to accept any of these democratic reforms, as they
will underline the democratic illegitimacy of the new President.  Council and Commission
reform are consequently intertwined, highly political, and strongly dependent on the outcome
of bargaining between the larger and smaller countries – with Germany potentially in a
position to play a pivotal role promoting effective and democratic reforms and preventing the
worst outcome of a weak new European Council President interacting poorly with a weak
Commission.
Communication and Participation
Increasing democracy in the EU is not only a question of institutional and structural changes.
It is a question of communication and participation.  It is the challenge of building a real
European political space and debate.  These issues are often misunderstood and poorly
focused on within the EU institutions, with emphasis being put on provision of information to
overcome lack of understanding.  But a dynamic, participative democratic system is not and
cannot be simply or mainly about one-way information flows.  What is needed is a step
change in political and public discussion of European political and policy structures and
initiatives.  But this would require new initiatives and actions and change in behaviour of
national and European politicians and officials.  The media has an important role to play here
too, but politicians and officials cannot simply ask or expect the media to write more about
the EU.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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National politicians, not least faced with the current democratic malaise in many of the EU
member states, need to acknowledge more directly and openly their role and responsibilities
in EU decision-making.  It is only national politicians who can explain and defend decisions
taken in the Council back in their respective national political arenas.  If they shy away from
this task, and instead, suggest or imply that responsibility for decisions taken lies elsewhere
(Brussels, the Commission, the bureaucracy), then this contributes in an important way to
confusion, mistrust and distance of the wider public.  This will be particularly the case if the
Convention and subsequent IGC agree a constitution for the EU: unless a political lead is
given in promoting debate and understanding of such a constitution, it will fail in one of its
main purposes.
Both Commission and Parliament also need to devote much more political time and resources
to developing effective communication strategies.  Particularly in the Commission, officials
need to take on board communication as part of their role.  Both institutions also have to face
up to the fact that what is needed is open, two-way communication and debate - debate that
will include criticism and disagreement: communication strategy is not the PR strategy of a
political spin-doctor.
Serious political commitment to promoting pan-European debate should also result in
innovative new ideas and experiments.  For example, in terms of openness and accountability,
the Commission could start each week with a one-hour weekly online question time with one
member of the Commission (with a different commissioner each week) - this would represent
a leap ahead of most member states.  The EP could have much more frequent question time
sessions with both Commission and Council presidents and could find a mechanism to
involve national MPs in those sessions.  Imaginative new mechanisms to involve national
MPs and engage them directly with MEPs and the EP – and not simply a new mechanism to
involve MPs in subsidiarity and competences decisions – could help to provoke a much more
rapid politicising of European debates in the individual member states.
While there has been some progress in relations with so-called 'organised' civil society,
particularly NGOs and interest groups, more needs to be done here too, to ensure coherence,
reliability and openness in consultation and dialogue processes – and to build on, and move
beyond, the Commission’s 2001 white paper on governance.  Overall, precisely because the
EU is not a state with directly equivalent political structures to those of individual member
states, which results in problems of legitimacy and comprehensibility, there is a need for all
those involved in EU political developments and institutions to ensure that the structures that
do exist are as open, accessible and engaged with the wider public as possible.
This is where the Convention itself could play a major role, and also faces a major challenge.
The way in which the Convention conducts itself, its actual process of work and debate, will
be vital for engaging the wider public, for engaging real national political attention and
encouraging the development of a genuine dynamic of political debate.  The risk for the
Convention is twofold.  The first risk is that, while it may engage in a range of dialogues with
NGOs, unions, business, think tanks and so on, it could fail to demonstrate that there is a real
two-way communication under way – to show the debates and ideas from the outside are
being fed into, and impacting on, the Convention.
The second risk is that its work and debates appear removed from current important political
challenges and issues.  The Convention is not a government and will not have a consensus
position until it produces its final document.  Nonetheless, through effective communicationKIRSTY HUGHES
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strategies it should be showing the direct relevance of its developing debates to key
contemporary issues.  For example, the wide support in the Convention already for
strengthening CFSP and for moving forward in the justice and home affairs area allows the
work of the Convention to be presented to the media and the wider public in the context of
current issues of debate, from the Middle East, to  antidiscrimination, globalisation and
terrorism.  It need not be a thing apart.  Moreover, it could take a leaf out of the approach of
the Council, and put forward ideas for change that do not require Treaty change, during its
work and not simply at its conclusion.  If the Convention cannot engage and provoke a wider
debate, then the chances of meeting the Laeken challenge of bringing the EU closer to its
citizens are slight, whatever the institutional changes it proposes.
The Democratic Problem – Summary of  Key Issues
•  Democratic legitimacy problems of EU institutions – need for EU to be more transparent,
comprehensible, representative and participative;
•  Relative powers and reforms of Council and Commission are fundamental to the nature of
the new EU – radical reforms of both are needed; greater  intergovernmentalism risks
weakening the EU;
•  Rotating Presidency needs reform;
•  Proposals for new European Council President will lead to confusion – with EU having
two Presidents (Council and Commission) appointed in the same manner, for same time
period. Both Presidents will lack democratic legitimacy.  Council-Commission
coordination may also suffer with increased conflicts, resulting in weak European Council
President and weak Commission;
•  Reform of General Affairs Council – split into two formations, foreign affairs and general
affairs;
•  Commission reform – need for a small Commission, with structures significantly
refocused on the pan-European policy dimension, for effective and coherent strategic
policy leadership, and to avoid national influences;
•  Greater accountability of Commission and bureaucracy to EP – election of President by
EP, and of Commissioners, or at least individual right of veto;
•  Step change in communication and promotion of democratic participation by all EU
institutions and political actors, including national politicians; new genuine
communication strategies; innovations such as weekly on-line question time, involvement
of national MPs in EP questioning of Commission president and EU presidency; more
coherent and reliable civil dialogue;
•  Convention has a key role to play here in demonstrating through its processes of
consultation and dialogue a new approach to participation and communication.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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5. The EU’s Voice in the World
The Laeken declaration set out high ambitions for a new EU role in the world, stating: "does
Europe not, now that it is finally unified, have a leading role to play in a new world order, that
of a power able both to play a stabilising role worldwide and to point the way ahead for many
countries and peoples?".  Whether or not the Convention will be able to set out a path for the
EU to achieve this new and highly ambitious role (both model and stabilising power) is open
to doubt. But what is vital is that the Convention does put forward serious and credible
proposals for the EU to have a much stronger political voice in the world.  The next
enlargement will underline once more the disparity between the EU's economic weight in the
world and its political influence - the economic giant/political dwarf syndrome.  In the current
global context, with the global agenda crowded with major issues from post September 11
and combating international terrorism, to the ongoing Middle East crisis, globalisation,
sustainability and development, the inadequacies of the EU as a global actor have been
painfully apparent and the need to strengthen its international role is very clear.  At the same
time developments, post September 11, have also underlined the pre-eminence of national
sovereignty in foreign policy, not least in the larger member states.
Another key factor for the EU in the current international environment is the sharp
deterioration in US-European relations.  From the fight against terrorism and weapons of
mass destruction in rogue states, to trade, Kyoto and the international criminal court, the US
and EU are facing recurring strategic differences.  Growing US unilateralism also serves to
emphasise the EU's weakness.  Yet at the same time, the sharpness of some of the differences
of view help to highlight what is distinctive about the EU's approach and also acts as a further
catalyst in the growing pressures for the EU to move forward in this area.  The EU argues for
a more multilateral approach, but its power to push international relations in this direction will
in fact depend on its ability to forge its own internal  multilateralism into a much stronger
common voice.  Enlargement will complicate this due to the increase both in numbers and in
the variety of interests.  But at the same time, the increase in number of member states also
increases the potential political weight of the EU and adds to the pressure to become at least a
stronger regional power.
The challenge for the Convention is not simply to look at EU foreign policy and institutional
structures, but to look across the range of EU international policies, and at their
interconnection with various aspects of internal policy.  One of the main difficulties that must
be faced up to are the diverse legal bases in the Treaty of different policies, not least the
spread of relevant international policies across the three pillars.  Given the different Treaty
bases for EU action, the Commission and the Council have varying roles and powers, both
across and within policy areas, which impact negatively on coherent, integrated and effective
policy-making.  The Commission, in particular, has a stronger role in trade and in aid and
development, all areas that offer a range of policy instruments, which can be used to support
and implement wider foreign policy aims.  But while many of the relevant instruments lie
with the Commission, the Council determines the CFSP policy framework.
One of the key challenges, therefore, is to situate international policies including trade, aid
and development, justice and home affairs, environment and sustainability, human rights and
foreign policy in a common framework with much closer  coordination and mutual
reinforcement across the policy areas.  This has led to arguments for a merger of the three
pillars, while retaining a range of instruments and decision-making procedures.  A number of
Convention members have argued for such a merger (in the May 23/24 meeting) as has theKIRSTY HUGHES
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Commission (Com (2002)247) although Giscard d’Estaing in summing up the May meeting
expressed strong doubts about the idea.
Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, has argued that the EU should focus as its first priority on
the governance of globalisation and the promotion of sustainable development.  So he
proposes that the Commission should have competence, as with trade, to negotiate on all
aspects of the management of globalisation from environment to transport to energy.  With
the launch of the euro, and the development of the euro-zone, such arguments gain weight
together with the related need for unified EU representation - or at least  euro-zone
representation - in international bodies including the IMF, G8 and World Bank.  If such goals
are to be reached, the need to strengthen internal policies in the enlarged EU, not least
structural and cohesion policy, is a vital element, if diversity of interests and sectional
interests are not to weaken and impede development of coherent and effective international
policy positions and strategies.  A clearer more coherent EU approach to management of
globalisation could also impact on other areas of concern to the Convention, not least if it
helps to open up a genuine pan-European debate with civil society and with younger people.
Nevertheless, if the EU puts its principal focus on globalisation without at the same time
looking to take major steps forward in the foreign and security policy dimension, it will be
failing to address some of the most pressing key contemporary challenges.  At the same time,
despite the importance of moving to greater coordination and integration,  many of the most
important challenges in CFSP come down to the fundamental issue of the political will and
interests of the member states in agreeing to, and acting on the basis of, a genuine common
policy rather than pursuing their own individual and independent policies. Structural changes
on their own cannot achieve this crucial element of political will and commitment.
 The difficulties of the EU becoming a strong political global actor are clear - and without a
step change, they will almost inevitably get worse in enlarging from 15 to 25 member states,
with the risk of very weak 'lowest common denominator' positions emerging.  In the post-
September 11th period, with the crisis in the Middle East, with the growing unilateralism of
the US, and with the threat of a US campaign against Iraq, the lack of  coordination and the
lack of strong commonly defined interests and policy positions among the EU member states
has been highlighted.  While many fear the possible role of an informal directoire of France,
Germany and the UK in a strengthened CFSP, events such the Middle East crisis and US
threats against Iraq, in fact highlight the lack of coordination and focused agreement among
the three 'bigs'.  The UK's so-called 'special relationship' with the US appears more often to
emphasise differences between the UK and other EU member states, rather than to provide a
route to explain and promote common European positions or to ameliorate fractious
transatlantic relations.
A step change in CFSP would require a major improvement in coordination and in political
will to define stronger common positions as a genuine framework for member states' foreign
policies.  This would require France, Germany and the UK to lead here in demonstrating
genuine political interests in progress.  At the same time, it is also clear that at 15, and even
more at 25, an effective CFSP cannot simply be built around an informal directoire of three.
The infamous Downing Street dinner of autumn 2001 - where the initial three-some of
France, Germany and the UK was expanded to include Italy, Spain, then the High
Representative, then the Belgian presidency and finally at the last minute the Prime Minister
of the Netherlands - demonstrated rather publicly the need for a more inclusive and coherent
approach.THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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Some of the institutional changes discussed above would contribute to improving the
functioning of CFSP.  Reform of the General Affairs Council, with the creation of a separate
Foreign Affairs Council would be one step forward.  This could be chaired by  Solana,
creating continuity and consistency - but if the presidency is successfully reformed, and the
six-month presidency abolished, then chairing by the new reformed presidency would also
result in more continuity and consistency than at present. A more focused, separate and
consistent Council could contribute to moving forward in terms of much greater attention to
priority setting and establishment of clear strategic frameworks in foreign policy, reinforced
by the work of the Political and Security Committee (COPS).  Furthermore, while up to now,
despite the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, QMV has not been used in CFSP, in the
medium run QMV should be used and extended.  The difficulties in this are, of course,
considerable but outside the security and defence area, it is the direction of progress.
In terms of greater coordination between Council and Commission, much discussion has
focused in the last two years on the proposal of merging the post of the High Representative
with that of the Commissioner for external relations (an idea supported already in 1999 by
Chris Patten, and proposed in a speech in 2000 by Prodi).  Certainly, the split between policy
formation and policy instruments represented by the two posts is not ideal.  But some consider
this idea premature, not least since Solana's position is relatively new.  Moreover, such a
merging of Council and Commission posts, with the new Representative taking part in
meetings in both institutions, has very wide institutional implications and ramifications – it is
not a stand-alone proposal.  The Commission (Com (2002)247) has proposed merger with the
post being located in the Commission, and having the sole right of initiative (though no
details are given of how the Council would then function) – Paris and London have been
quick to reject these ideas.
Germany (who pushed hard in Laeken for a strong emphasis on the external dimension and is
generally pushing for stronger and more rapid action on CFSP) supports, however, fusion of
the two posts, while France talks of increasing synergy.  If synergy is a code word for the
status quo, then it is obviously inadequate.  But serious proposals to improve coordination and
interaction could provide the basis to move forward, and ultimately to bring the two positions
together.
Making progress will not be easy, yet more has been done in recent years on CFSP, and
especially on ESDP, than would have been predicted in the mid-1990s. Even so, much faster
and more substantial progress will be needed if the difficulties the EU faces in having a strong
voice at this critical current global conjuncture are to be overcome, and overcome with
sufficient rapidity.  The Convention cannot substitute for political will among the member
states, but it can show the institutional and organisational route forward as well as putting the
political challenge clearly to the member states.
Voice in the World – Summary of Key Issues
•  Enlargement underlines EU position as economic giant and political dwarf;
•  Global instability and uncertainty, and deteriorating EU-US relationship, add to pressure
for urgent step change in EU’s international role – political will of member states still key
hurdle;KIRSTY HUGHES
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•  Diverse legal bases of different international policies problematic; need for a common
framework for trade, aid and development, environment, justice and security, human
rights and foreign policy; merge three pillars;
•  Major increase in  coordination of member states’ foreign policies within common
framework needed;
•  Institutional changes include establishment of a separate Foreign Affairs Council; move
towards greater QMV in foreign policy (not security and defence); greater synergy, and in
the medium run merger, of the High Representative and Commissioner for External
Relations posts.
6. Conclusions
The challenges for the Convention and IGC are clear and daunting.  But the Convention has
the chance, and the political challenge, of demonstrating that where intergovernmental
decision-making behind closed doors has proved inadequate in the past, the open and more
inclusive approach of the Convention can succeed.
The Convention is still only at the early stages of its work. But many, if not most, of the
choices open to it are already known – it is the selection across those choices that will
determine the shape of the future EU.  On the basis of these different choices, together with
the different political groupings and interests within the Convention and across the member
states and candidates, it is possible to identify a number of scenarios that help to illustrate the
potential implications of the choices made. Five scenarios are briefly identified below:
1) Emergent Global Political Power
The EU takes major steps forward in democracy, efficiency and in international policy-
making.  Consequently, it begins to have a stronger, effective global voice, understood by the
European public and legitimated by effective democratic processes.
Democracy:  Clear, basic constitutional Treaty; stronger  accountability of Commission
bureaucracy to the Commission, and of Commission to the EP:
Commission President elected by the European Parliament, Commissioners either elected or
at least endorsed separately by the EP; open  up Council – legislative sessions to be held in
public; extend EP’s rights of co-decision; step change in communication strategy and civil
dialogue, including national politicians taking on their responsibilities for explaining and
acknowledging their role in EU decisions;
innovations in communication (e.g. weekly online question time of commissioners);
new and innovative involvement of national parliaments;  no moves to formal, separate
decision-making for avant-garde (no exclusive two-speed EU).
Efficiency:  reduce size of Commission to 12; restructure Commission resources, increasing
focus on strategic policy development, and reducing resources in areas of strongly national
competence; reform Council of Ministers and European Council – split General Affairs
Council, creating a Foreign Affairs Council and a new permanent Coordination Council (with
ministers designated by their heads of state); bring the European Council within  EU`sTHE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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institutional framework; abolish six-month presidency – introduce new, longer term
presidency;  abolish Nice voting weights and QMV conditions and replace with simple double
majority voting; extend QMV; clarify processes for competences and subsidiarity and include
national parliaments in the new processes.
International Policies: Create an effective common framework for all international policies –
trade, development, aid, justice and home affairs (in their international dimensions), human
rights and foreign policy, with closer  coordination and integration of these policy areas.
Integrate the three pillars, while maintaining different decision-making and policy
developments approaches for different policy areas; create a new Foreign Affairs Council,
chaired by the High Representative; in the medium run, extend QMV in foreign policy (but
not in defence and security); in the medium run, merge the posts of High Representative and
Commissioner for external relations, in the short run, develop new procedures for
substantially improved and visible synergy.
2) Struggling Global Power
The EU takes weak steps forward on democratic changes, makes more effective changes on
the efficiency side, but moves towards an intergovernmental model for the EU.  The EU
makes significant changes in international policy formulation. But over time democratic
inadequacies, the lack of an effective pan-European strategic policy, leadership function and
conflict in the Council, not least over the decisions of the executive Council, leads to national
differences coming to the fore and the EU struggles to have its voice heard in the world.
Democracy:  Basic constitutional Treaty – but clarity marred by complex formulations
representing strong national differences; no changes to Commission accountability; Council
legislative sessions to be held in public; no new and innovative communication strategy;
formalisation of eurogroup leads to emergence of  two-speed EU through de facto barriers
impeding candidates’ joining the euro.
Efficiency:  Commission stays large – with number of Commissioners to match number of
member states; Council of Ministers and European Council reformed – abolish six-month
presidency and creation of new five year European Council President, appointed by European
Council members; creation of new executive Council, chaired by president and made up of
chairs of the (reduced to) eigth Council formations;  General Affairs Council, creating a
Foreign Affairs Council and a new permanent  Coordination Council (with ministers
designated by their heads of state); bring European Council within  EU institutional
framework; maintain Nice voting weights and QMV conditions; extend QMV; clarify
processes for  competences and  subsidiarity and include national parliaments in the new
processes.
International Policies: Create processes for more effective coordination  for all international
policies – trade, development, aid, justice and home affairs (in their international dimensions),
human rights and foreign policy. Create a new Foreign Affairs Council, chaired by the
European Council President; develop new procedures for substantially improved and visible
synergies between the High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations.KIRSTY HUGHES
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3) Efficient but Weak EU
The EU takes major steps forward in democracy and efficiency, but not in international
policy-making.  Consequently, the enlarged EU function relatively well, but do not manage to
act effectively as a regional power and so faces more difficulties in relations with neighbours
and with the stability of its regional environment.
Democracy:  Clear, basic constitutional Treaty; stronger accountability of Commission
bureaucracy to the Commission, and of Commission to the EP: Commission President elected
by the European Parliament, Commissioners either elected, or at least endorsed separately by
the EP; open up Council – legislative sessions to be held in public; extend EP’s rights of co-
decision;  step change in communication strategy and civil dialogue, including national
politicians taking on their responsibilities for explaining and acknowledging their role in EU
decisions; innovations in communication (e.g. weekly online question time of
commissioners); new and innovative involvement of national parliaments;  no moves to
formal, separate decision-making for avant-garde (no exclusive 2-speed EU).
Efficiency:  reduce size of Commission to 12; restructure Commission resources, increasing
focus on strategic policy development, and reducing resources in areas of strongly national
competence; reform Council of Ministers and European Council – split General Affairs
Council, creating a Foreign Affairs Council and a new permanent Coordination Council (with
ministers designated by their heads of state); bring  European Council within EU institutional
framework; abolish six-month presidency – introduce new, longer term presidency;  abolish
Nice voting weights and QMV conditions and replace with simple double majority voting;
extend QMV; clarify processes for  competences and  subsidiarity and include national
parliaments in the new processes.
International Policies: New Foreign Affairs Council created, chaired by presidency. No
action to improve synergy or coherence across different areas of international policy. No
change in positions of High Representative and Commissioner for External Relations.
4)  Efficient but Unstable EU
The EU makes some improvements in efficiency, following a much stronger
intergovernmental approach but does less in terms of democratic changes and little on the
international side.  The intergovernmental approach combined with absence of sufficient
democratic change results in inadequate popular support for the EU, together with national
frictions between member states.  The EU’s development is unstable and problematic.
Democracy:  Basic constitutional Treaty – but clarity marred by complex formulations
representing strong national differences; no changes to Commission accountability; Council
legislative sessions to be held in public; no new and innovative communication strategy;
formalisation of eurogroup leads to emergence of  two-speed EU through de facto barriers
impeding candidates’ joining the euro.
Efficiency:  Commission stays large – with number of Commissioners to match number of
member states; Council of Ministers and European Council  reformed – abolish six-month
presidency and creation of new five year European Council President, appointed by European
Council members; creation of new executive Council, chaired by president and made up of
chairs of the (reduced to) eight Council formations;  reform of General Affairs Council,THE FUTURE OF EUROPE CONVENTION
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creating a Foreign Affairs Council and a new permanent Coordination Council (with ministers
designated by their heads of state); bring European Council within  EU institutional
framework; maintain Nice voting weights and QMV conditions; extend QMV; clarify
processes for  competences and  subsidiarity and include national parliaments in the new
processes.
International Policies: New Foreign Affairs Council created, chaired by European Council
president. No action to improve synergy or coherence across different areas of international
policy. No change in positions of High Representative and Commissioner for External
Relations.
5) Technocratic, Stalled and Inefficient EU
The Convention and IGC fail to agree on major changes and only some tinkering is achieved,
not moving much beyond the Nice Treaty.  Decision-making in the enlarged EU is extremely
difficult with many blockages. Public dissatisfaction with the EU grows and national
differences of view become sharper.  Attempts to move forward within the eurogroup fail due
to public discontent and different national reactions to a deteriorating global environment.
Democracy:  No constitutional Treaty; no changes to Commission accountability; Council
legislative sessions to be held in public; no new and innovative communication strategy;
formalisation of eurogroup leads to emergence of  two-speed EU through de facto barriers
impeding candidates’ joining the euro.
Efficiency:  Commission stays large – with number of Commissioners to match number of
member states; six-month presidency abolished and replaced by team presidency of 3
countries for 18 months; no reform of General Affairs Council; maintain Nice voting weights
and QMV conditions; no extension of  QMV; no new role for national parliaments; complex
new procedures for allocation of competences and subsidiarity.
International Policies:  no changes to international policy coordination or to CFSP.
These scenarios are only indicative of how different decisions may come together to create
the overall structures and dynamics of the new EU.  But they underline the importance of not
looking at individual changes in isolation.  The most positive scenario is the first one, of the
emergent global power.  This requires the EU to move forward in democratic and efficiency
terms while managing to renew and maintain its balance between intergovernmental and
supranational approaches.  Success of this scenario requires substantial Commission reform
together with many changes in the Council, and an understanding of the requirements of
participative democracy.
In an enlarged EU, reforms that do not provide adequate scope and room within EU structures
for genuine pan-European policy-development and that move too far in an intergovernmental
direction, risk creating a situation where it is increasingly difficult to ensure coherence and
achieve common views. But a renewed dynamic combination of the supranational and
intergovernmental will also not succeed without substantial changes in democratic
involvement and participation.   The scenarios also underline the importance of the
international dimension.  The enlarged EU cannot isolate itself or cut itself off from the wider
world.  Unless major steps forward are taken to strengthen the EU’s international voice, thenKIRSTY HUGHES
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even a more democratic and efficient EU will find itself buffeted by global forces over which
it has little control.
The challenges facing the EU are pressing.  In a calmer and more stable global  environment,
the triple challenge of tackling the democratic deficit, managing the politics and organisation
of the enlarged EU, and building a genuine global voice, would be hard and comprehensive
enough.  In the current global context, it is both much more difficult and more urgent to rise
to these challenges. Much lies on the shoulders of the future of Europe Convention – an
important innovation in the preparation of these fundamental decisions, not least in its
openness and composition.  But events may move rapidly ahead and past the steady timetable
of the Convention and IGC.  The challenge for the Convention, and for all the political
groupings within it, is to demonstrate, not only that it can come up with focused substantive
solutions that will revitalise and restructure the EU to meet the needs and demands of
European and global politics, but also that it can engage with the wider world – with the
public, with unfolding events – in the process of its work.  If it does not, it risks being seen as
a fundamental political distraction, on the sidelines as global events move rapidly forward.1
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